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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitial change in the
very tissue of the law."-MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, Collected Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILE OWNERS OR OPERATORS-THEIR DUTY TO GUESTS
-STATUTES.
Kaley v. Huntley et. al.'
This was an action for damages suffered from an injury received by plaintiff
while riding with the defendants in the latter's automobile as a gratuitous guest.
Judgment for defendants was set aside and a new trial ordered on the ground of
error in instructions. Defendants appealed from that order. The instruction given
was that defendant owed plaintiff the duty to exercise ordinary care, and the court
had refused an instruction offered by plaintiff hypothesizing the highest degree of
care as the measure of defendant's duty. It was held that the driver of an automobile
owes a higher degree of care under the statute than ordinary care and that since no
exception is made from this general rule it applies in gratuitous transportation of
guests. The rule as here established by the statute makes it the duty of a person
operating a motor vehicle to exercise the highest degree of care as to persons riding
in the car.
Many cases dealing with the duty owed by automobile owners or operators
to their guests have been decided in recent years. The general rule is well established
that the owner or operator has a duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care
in the operation of the car so as not to unreasonably expose him to danger and injury
by increasing the hazard of travel., However, there are some jurisdictions which
1. 333 Mo. 771, 63 S. W. (2d) 21 (1933).
2. Cases collected in 20 A.L.R. 1014; 26 A.L.R.
1425; 40 A.L.R. 1338; 47 A.L.R. 327; 51 A.L.R. 581:
61 A.L.R. 1252; 65 A.L.R. 952.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN

follow a well defined minority rule which requires the showing of gross negligence
in order to hold the owner or operator liable for an injury to an invited guest. 3
This minority rule has sometimes been followed by the courts through a falsely
based feeling of sportsmanship, and a desire to protect one who primarily, because
of his hospitality, is faced with a pecuniary loss. But where the safety of persons is at
stake the operator of a car should not be excused from ordinary care simply because
another man, his guest, has not paid him. Ordinary reasonable care is a duty imposed by law and not one raised upon the payment of a fare.,
Under the decisions and under the statutes one who accepts a ride in any vehicle
without giving compensation in any manner is a guest. There are two types or
classes of guests-invited guests and permitted guests i. e., guests at sufferance. In a
very few cases a distinction has been made between these two classes as to the duty
owed them by the owner or operator of the automobile in which they are riding.,
In a few cases it has been held that guests at sufferance were only licensees,
and that a defendant owed them only the duty of refraining from wantonly or willfully injuring them.6 But it has been pointed out that there is no real basis for the
distinction: "It seems to us that the only sensible and humane rule is that an owner
and driver of an automobile owes a guest at sufferance the duty of using reasonable
care so as not to injure him. The rule as to trespassers and licensees upon real estate
...is not to be applied to one riding in an automobile.", The reason for not treating a
guest only as a licensee is that the driver takes the guest's life in his hands when he
starts the car in motion. A licensee upon land knows that the land will remain
stationary, his fate is not placed in the hands of another as it is when he enters a
motor car, and as the Indiana case continues, "The law exacts of one who puts
a force in motion that he shall control it with skill and care in proportion to the
danger created. This rule applies to a guest at sufferance as well as to a guest by
invitation."
It has been this class of guests, guests at sufferance, that is largely responsible
for statutes in some of our states which take the question of degree of care required
out of the hands of the courts. These legislatures have attempted to protect owners
and operators from the growing army of hitch-hikers. These statutes release the
owner or driver from liability f6r injuries to guests, excepting usually _those caused
by the intoxication of the driver, or by intentional or wanton misconduct, and by
gross negligence. 8 Although such statutes have been held to be constitutional they
are not desirable. Not only are they based upon the same false reasoning of sportsmanship and a desire to protect hospitality as are the decisions following the
minority rule (as pointed out earlier in this note), but their results are questionable

6. Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N. J. L. 64, 108 Ati. 862
3. Cases collected in 20 A.L.R. 1018; 26 A.L.R.
1427; 40 A.L.R. 1339; 47 A.L.R. 328; 51 A.L.R. 582; (1920).
61 A.L.R. 1254; 65 A.L.R. 954.
7. Munson v. Rupker, 148 N. E. 169 (Ind. App.
4. In Siegrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo. App. 197 (1881), 1925).
In Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W.
the St. Louis Court of Appeals aptly shows the basis
of the general rule when they in substance say, that 855 (1923), the court held that "the owner or driver
there are no degrees of negligence where the subject of a vehicle upon a public highway owes to a gratuiof the bailment is human life, and where one gratui- tous guest tie duty of exercising ordinary care to
tously carries another an omission to use that skill avoid personal injury, and upon a breach of such duty
which his situation implies is imputed to him is gross is liable for resulting damages whether the guest
negligence,
asked for the favor or is invited by the host."
8. Cases collected in 20 A.L.R. 1021; 51 A.L.R.
5. Cases collected 20 A.L.R. 1025; 26 A.L.R.
1428; 40 A.L.R. 1340; 47 A.L.R. 329; 51 A.L.R. 583; 61 A.L.R. 1255; 65 A.L.R. 954.

584; 61 A.L.R. 1260; 65 A.L.R. 956.
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because the safety of the public is dihninished and all that is accomplished is an advantage to negligent hosts and liability insurance companies.9
The language of our own statute causes much confusion for it is difficult to
determine just what the legislature intended from the wording of the statute. By
using the words "highest degree of care", is something more than reasonable care required? The statute of 1907 states, "All persons owning, operating or controlling an
automobile... shall use the highest degree of care that a very careful person would
use, under like or similar circumstances..
U In a note in this BULLETIN" the
writer, citing a number of cases, shows that our courts at that time applied the
statute as meaning reasonable care under the circumstances. The same writer in a
later issue of the BULLETIN" explains that this interpretation of the statute by the
courts was embodied in the statute of 1911. There the statute reads: "Every person
operating a motor vehicle on the public highwaysof this state shall drive the same
in a careful and prudent manner, and at a rate of speed so as not to endanger the
property of another or the life or limb of any person .....
13 In 1921 our present
statute was enacted which provides that, "Every person operating a motor vehicle
on the highways of this state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner,
and shall exercise the highest degree of care, and at a rate of speed so as not to endanger the property of another or the life or limb of any person .....
11
In recent years the tendency of legislatures in other states has been to lessen the
burden upon the driver host. Certainly our own legislature has not moved in
that direction. On the contrary, in the light of the statutes of 1911 and 1921 it appears that our statute holds a driver to a higher degree of care than that of a reasonable man. And such was the effect given the statute by the court in the instant case.
The court felt there was no room for construction of the language and felt themselves bound by the statute to hold a driver to the highest degree of care. In Alley v.
Wall, 5 the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that it was the duty of an automobile
owner and driver to use reasonable care in its operation. The court in the instant
case says concerning that case, "If by reasonable care was meant ordinary careand those terms are sometimes, though inaccurately by way of definition, used
interchangably, but neither of which is a sufficient designation of the highest degree
of care-that holding is disapproved."
It is no doubt desirable to hold the driver to at least reasonable care towards his
guest as do the great majority of the courts. However, is it desirable to go beyond
this and demand a higher degree of care? But our legislature has spoken and the
court cannot put other than the obvious meaning upon the statute.
LAWRENCE ROBERT BROWN

9.
10.
11.
12.

(1929) 14 IOWA LAW REVIEW 243.
Laws 1907, p. 73; Mo. R. S. (1909) sec. 8523.
(1920) 18 U. oF Mo. BULL. LAW SER. 48.
(1920) 19 U. or Mo. BULL. LAW SER. 51.

13.

Laws 1911, pp. 329-330, sec. 12 par. 9; Mo.

R. S. (1919) sec. 7585.
14. Laws 1921, p. 91 sec. 19; Mo. R. S. (1929)
sec. 7775.
15.
272 S. W. 999 (Mo. App. 1925).
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EXEMPTIONS-INSURANCE PROCEEDS INVESTED IN PROPERTY
-Bank of Brimson v. Graham.,
The defendant widow received $2,037 from an assessment plan life insurance
policy issued upon the life of her husband in which she was named as beneficiary.
Out of this money she paid off $800, the principal indebtedness and some interest,
against the forty acres in question, leaving it clear of indebtedness. Its value did not
exceed this amount. Later the widow signed as security for her son, Claire, the note
upon which the plaintiff sued her and obtained judgment, this note being a renewal
of a note signed by her husband in his lifetime as security for Claire. The $1500
note to Hughes and the conveyance herein sought to be set aside were executed and
delivered by her after she signed the note to the plaintiff and before the judgment
was obtained against her thereon. The defendant claims exemption of the land under
section 5752, R. S. 1929,2 in that the exemption of the insurance money extended
and attached to the property on which the encumberance had been paid off with
this money as against the plaintiff's debt contracted subsequently. It is not a claim
of exempt funds being reinvested in other property exempt under statute or that the
land was exempt as a homestead. The court said the majority of the courts held that
such exemption statutes "applied to insurance money only before it has been paid
over to the beneficiary, and thereafter did not exempt from garnishment money which
had been paid as a benefit to the beneficiary and had been deposited in a bank".
This rule has been liberalized by some courts "to the extent that such exempt money,
though received and deposited in the bank by the beneficiary, is still held exempt".
But there is "no persuasive authority holding that under such a statute the money
may be invested in other property not exempt and such statutory exemption be
extended thereto". If the legislature so intended, it might easily have said so.
3
Cases on the precise question involved here are rare. In Kansas and Kentucky'
in the hands
policy
a
life
insurance
of
to
the
proceeds
statute
given
by
the exemption
of the beneficiary does not extend to the property purchased with it and the decisions
in these two states are thus in accord with the principal case. But the contrary rule
prevails in Iowa, where it was stated in the case of Cook v. l1ee that to hold otherwise "might, and often times would, destroy the benefits the statute intended to
confer." Some courts limit the operations of various acts exempting insurance money
to obligations incurred before payment,' or give protection only until it has reached
the hands of the beneficiary. 7 Exemption statutes even in these narrow limits
accomplish good results and are well worth while.
The problem presented in this case is analogous to the exemption of proceeds
of insurance on property itself exempt and of proceeds of a voluntary sale of a homestead. By some statutes it is expressly provided that the proceeds of insurance

1.

3.

76 S. W. (2d.) 376 (Mo. 1934).

2. Mo.

R.

S.

(1929)

Section

5752,

"The

money or other benefit, charity, relief or aid to be
paid, provided or rendered by any corporation
authorized to do business under this article, shall not
be liable to attachment or other process, and shall
not be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by
any legal or equitable process, nor by operation of law,
to pay any debt or liability of a policy or certificate
holder, or any beneficiary named in a policy or certificate."

Pelfy v. Reynolds, Kan. 115 105, 222 Pac. 121

(1924).
4. J. S. Merrel Drug Co. v. Dixon, 131 Ky. 212,
115 S. W. 179 (1909).
5. Booth v. Martin, 158 Iowa 434, 139 N. W. 888
(1913); Cook v. Allee, 119 Iowa 226, 93 N. W. 93
(1903).
6. Reiff v. Armour & Co., 79 Wash. 48, 139 Pac.
633, note, L.R.A. 1915 A, 1201 (1914).
7. Cranz v. White. 27 Kan. 319, 41 Am. Rep.
408 (1882); L.R.A. 1915 A. 1204; 6 A.L.R. 610.
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on property, itself exempt from execution, shall also be exempt. 8 In the absence of a
statute expressly extending exemptions to proceeds of insurance, a minority group
of the courts has held that the exemption did not extend to such proceeds due or
paid. 9 But the great weight of authority is to the effect that in view of the purpose
for which exemption statutes are enacted, an exemption of certain property extends
to the proceeds of insurance due or paid for its destruction, and this is irrespective of
whether the property destroyed was personal property in general, homestead
property, or public property.' 0 This view seems to be the reasonable one, with the
insurance money just representing or standing in the place of the property itself."
The purpose underlying all these exemption statutes is to secure to the unfortunate
debtor who is the head of the family, the means to support and to secure the necessities of life for himself and his family,12 the protection of the family being the main
consideration.13 In some jurisdictions this general rule has been qualified by the
words "for a reasonable time" or by other words of similar import.' 4 The insurance
money itself is exempt only to the same extent as was the property, 15 but such money
is exempt from liens upon the property itself at the time of its destruction.16
As a general rule the purchase price of homestead property is not exempt from
the claims of creditors, in the absence of express statutory provisions as to such
proceeds.1 7 The cases that hold the proceeds of the voluntary sale of a homestead
to be exempt refer to explicit statutory provisions granting such exemption, usually
for a limited period. 18 The Missouri cases hold that a homesteader can dispose of
one homestead and, with the proceeds, acquire another, and the new homestead
will be exempt from execution as fully as the old one was. A reasonable time must be
allowed to make a change of residence, depending upon the circumstances of each
case.' 9 The new homestead must be purchased within a reasonable time, and it is.
8.
See Gardenshire v. Glasser, 26 Ariz. 503, 226
Pac. 911 (1924); Purless Pacific Co. v. Burckhard,
90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037 (1916); Ketcham v.
Ketcham, 269 Ill. 584, 109 N. E. 1025 (1915); Fletcher
v. Staples, 62 Minn. 471, 64 N. W. 1150 (1895).
9. West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire
Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917); Smith v.
Ratcliff, 66 Miss 683, 6 So. 460 (1899); Monniea v.
German Ins. Co., 12 11. App. 240 (1882); Wooster v.
Page, 54 N. H. 125. 20 Am. Rep. 128 (1873).
10. See Wabash R. Co. v. Bowring, 103 Mo. App.
158, 77 S. W. 106 (1903); Sorenson v. City Nat. Bank,
293 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Booker v.
First Nat. Bank, 117 Okla. 179, 245 Pac. 881 (1926);
Armstrong-Turner Millinery Co. v. Round, 106 Kan.
146, 186 Pac. 979 (1920); Bayer v. Sack, 66 Misc.
536, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (1910); Chipman v. Carroll, 53 Kan. 163, 35 Pac. 1109 (1894); Reynolds v.
Haines, 83 Iowa 342, 49 N. W. 851 (1891); Probst v.
Scott, 31 Ark. 652 (1877).
11.
Booker v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 10;
Chipman v. Carroll, supra note 10; Reynolds v.
Haines, supra note 10; Continental Ins. Co. v.
Daly, 33 Kan. 601, 7 Pac. 158 (1885); Probst v.
Scott, supra note 10.
12.
Megehe v. Draper, 21 Mo. 510, 64 Am. D. 245
(1855); Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131
Pac. 697 (1913); Allison v. Brookshire, 38 Tex. 199
(1873); Wilcox v. Hawley, 31 N. Y. 648 (1864).
13.
Schooley v. Schooley, 184 Iowa 835, 169
N. W. 56 (1918); Grant v. Phoenix-Jellico Coal Co.,

155 Ky. 585, 159 S. W. 1161 (1913); Puget Sound
Dressed Beef & Packing Co. v. Jeffs, 11 Wash. 466,
39 Pac. 962 (1895); Reynolds v. Haines, supra note
10; Wilcox v. Hawley, supra note 12.
14. Sorenson v. City Nat. Bank, supra note 10;
Walter Connally & Co. v. Hopkins, 195 S. W. 656.
(Ter. Civ. App. 1917), aff'd 221 S. W. 1082 (1920);
Bayer v. Sack, supra note 10; Reynolds v. Haines,
supra note 10; Continental Ins. Co. v. Daly, supra
note 11.
15.
Wallins Nat. Bank v. Turner, 221 Ky. 562, 299
S.W. 194 (1927); Rulo v. Murphy, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 295.
51 S. W. 312 (1899); Bernheim Bros. v. Davitt, 9
Ky. L. Rep. 229, 5 S. W. 193 (1887).
16. Walter Conally & Co. v. Hopkins, supra note
14; Chipman v. Carroll, supra note 10; Cameron v.
Fay, 55 Tex. 58 (1881).
17. Fred v. Bramen. 96 Minn. 484, 107 N. W.
159 (1906); Womack v. Stokes, 12 Tex. Civ. App.
648, 35 S. W. 82 (1896); Giddens v. Williamson, 65
Ala. 439 (1880).
18. Kinberlin v. Gordon, 139 Mo. App. 464, 122
S. W. 1144 (1909); Zollinger v. Dunnaway, 105 Mo,
App. 236, 78 S. W. 666 (1904); Prugh v. Portsmouth
Say. Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309 (1896); Watson
v. Saxer, 102 Ill. 585 (1882).
See Mo. R. S.
(11)29) section 616.
19. Rose v. Smith, 167 Mo. 81, 66 S. W. 94a,
(1902); Goode v. Lewis, 118 Mo. 357, 24 S. W. 61
(1893); Creath v. Dale, 84 Mo. 349 (1884).
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immaterial whether the money going into it was the proceeds of a mortgage on the
old homestead or from* the sale of it.,0 The Missouri statute only exempts the
homestead and the proceeds thereof invested in another homestead and not the proceeds invested in property not acquired for a homestead., This is consistent with
the holding in the principal case.
HENRY TIFFIN TETERS

LL.B., '35.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONSPIRACY TO ALIENATE AFFECTIONS.
Grubb v.Curry.,
This was an action against plaintiff's father-in-law and mother-in-law for
damages for the alienation of the affections of plaintiff's wife. A verdict was rendered against the father-in-law alone and he appealed. The petition alleged that
"the defendants. . .did wrongfully, wickedly, and maliciously entice, influence and
induce plaintiff's wife to leave and abandon him..." A demurrer to the evidence
on the ground that the petition charged a conspiracy between the defendants, and
that the evidence in behalf of plaintiff was insufficient to support that allegation,
was overruled. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the case was properly
submitted to the jury, because "the gist of the modern civil action of conspiracy
is the damage and not the combination..." and ". . ordinarily a verdict may be
rendered against one of the defendants, even though no conspiracy is proved."
Conceding that a conspiracy was actually charged here, which seems very
doubtful, the court's ruling on this point is in accord with what seems to be the
unanimous holding of other jurisdictions in the United States as to alienation of
affection cases, 2 and also as to other civil conspiracies. 3 The cases make no attempt
to distinguish between a conspiracy to alienate affections, and a conspiracy to commit any other tort. In both they are content to settle the question merely by saying
that the liability of joint tort-feasors is joint and several, that the allegation of conspiracy is only surplusage, or matter of inducement, and that the damage, not the
combination, is the gist of the action. Typical language is used in the Minnesota
case of Huot v. Wise: "The conspiracy alleged is not the gist of the action... But
20. Martin v. Cox, 199 S. W. 185 (Mo. 1917);
Klotz v. Rhodes, 240 Mo. 499, 144 S. W. 791 (1912).

21. Osborne & Co. v. Evans, 185 Mo. 509,84S.W.
963 (1904); State ex relv. Hull, 99 Mo. App. 703,
74 S.W. 888 (1903).

1. 72 S. W. (2d) 863 (Mo. App. 1934).
2. Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68, 6 N. W. 425
(1880); Huling v. Huling, 32 ill. App. 519 (1889);
Heisler v. Heisler, 151 Iowa 503, 131 N. W. 676 (1911);
Smith v. Smith, 42 S. Dak. 205, 173 N. W. 843
(1919); Boom v. Boom, 206 Iowa 70, 220 N. W. 17
(1928); Dunbier v. Mengedoht, 230 N. W. 669
(Neb. 1930); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 156 AtI. 354 (Del.
1931); Falk v. Falk, 181 N. E. 715 (Mass. 1932).
3. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N. Y. 1845.);
Laverty v. Vanartsdale, 65 Pa. 507 (1870); Rundell v.
Kalbfus, 125 Pa. 123, 17 Ati. 238 (1889); Van Horn v.
Van Horn, 56 N. J. Law 318, 28 Atl. 669 (1894);
Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S. E. 459 (1901);
Hansen v. Nicoll, 40 App. D. C. 228 (1913); Dickson

v. Lights, 170 S. W. 834 (Tex. 1914); Harbison v.
White, 56 Okla. 566, 156 Pac. 335 (1916); Jahr v.
Steffen, 187 Iowa 168,174 N. W. 109 (1919); Dixon v.
City of Reno, 43 Nev. 413, 187 Pac. 308 (1920);
Swartz v. Kay, 89 W. Va. 641, 109 S. E. 822 (1921);
Boesch v. Kick, 97 N. J. Law 92, 116 Atl. 796 (1922);
Goble v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 124 S. C. 19, 115
S. E. 900 (1923); Kile v. Anderson, 182 Wis. 467,
196 N. W. 762 (1924); Silliman v. Dobner, 165
Minn. 87, 205 N. W. 696 (1925); Faust v. Parker,
213 N. W. 794 (Iowa 1927); Pylea v-. Armstrong, 275
Pac. 753 (Mont. 1929); Gabriel v. Collier, 29 Pac.
(2d.) 1025 (Ore. 1934). But cf. Landau v. Hostetter,
266 Pa. 7, 109 AtI. 478 (1920).
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the case stands like any tort alleged to have been committed jointly by two or more
defendants."
Another case from the St. Louis Court of Appeals6 is in accord with the principal
case, but the Missouri law is apparently unsettled, since there are no Supreme Court
cases directly in point, and since the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Fronk v.
Fronk, held that the plaintiff having charged a conspiracy could recover only on
proving it. An earlier case, Leavell v.Leavell,' also indicated that the jury must find
a conspiracy, but elsewhere in the case the court said that the plaintiff could have
recovered against one of the defendants alone, if he were solely responsible for the
damage. The court in Fronk v. Fronk might have meant to continue the doctrine
of Leavell v. Leavell and say that for both defendants to be held, there must be proof
of a conspiracy, but that the plaintiff would be allowed to recover from one defendant
if that one caused the injury. However, there is nothing in the case to indicate that
the court meant other than that if the plaintiff charged a conspiracy, he must prove
it in order to recover at all. Such a holding is decidedly against the weight of the
decisions of other courts, both in Missouri and elsewhere, but it is not entirely without merit. Although in an action charging a conspiracy to alienate affections, as well
as in an action charging a conspiracy to cause some other injury to a person or his
property, the courts say the gist of the action is the damage, and the charge of conspiracy is surplusage, it seems that a distinction might be made between the two.
In an ordinary tort action the fact that several persons co-operated to produce the
injury causes no more damage to the plaintiff than the sum of the individual efforts of
all the participants. But in an alienation of affections case, a concerted effort on
the part of several members of a family is likely to have a much greater psychological
effect in producing the estrangement than would be the case if each of those persons
had acted alone. It seems possible that a court might take this into consideration,
and hold that if a plaintiff charges a conspiracy, he must prove it in order to recover.
If the Missouri Supreme Court wishes to follow the case of Fronk v. Fronk,
the way is open, for in the only case by that court touching the question, Miller v.
Busey,s it was said that "while the petition.. .used words which are ordinarily used
in charging a conspiracy, we do not consider. . .(that) it was in fact intended to
charge a conspiracy."
Even the cases cited by the court in the instant case fail to uphold its position,
provided we distinguish alienation of affection cases from other conspiracy cases,
since five of the cases it relies on have nothing to do with alienation of affection. 9
The other two cases it refers to are Miller v. Busey, which as we have seen was not
decided on the ground of a conspiracy, and Raleigh v. Raleigh,1° which merely holds
that it-was not necessary to plead a conspiracy in order to recover, and which cites
Miller v. Busey.
WILLIAM L. NELSON, JR.

4.

27 Minn. 68,6 N. W. 425 (1880).

5.
Barton v. Barton, 119 Mo. App. 501. 94 S. W.
574 (1906). This case says that an "essential fact
to be proved was that the defendants co-operated
together with the intention of bringing about the
separation," but it goes on to say "because the nature
of the case is such that the d~fendante are not jointly
(italics ours) liable unless they co-operated."

6.
7.
8.

159 Mo. App. 543, 141 S.W. 692 (1911).
114 Mo. App. 24, 89 S.W. 55 (1905).
186 S.W. 983 (Mo. 1,16).

9.

Boston v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461, 23 N. E.

210 (1890) (conspiracy to profit from city's purchase
of land); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. Law 284,
20 Ad. 485 (1890) (conspiracy to drive a trader out
of business);'Winn v. K. C. Belt Ry. Co., 245 Mo.
406, 151 S. W. 98 (1912) (negligence in operating
train); Boehm v. General Electric Co., 179 Mo. App.
663, 162 S. W. 723 (1913) (armature falling and in-

juring plaintiff); Schultz v. Ins. Co., 151 Wis 537,
139 N. W. 386 (1913).
10. 5 S.W. (2d.) 689 (Mo. App. 1928).
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TORTS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN MAKING REPAIRS OR IMPROVEMENTS. Bloecher v. Duerbeck:' Vitale v. Duerbeck.
The defendant landlord employed an independent contractor to install an
Arcola hot water heating plant in the rented premises, the tenant agreeing to pay a
higher rent. About a month after the work was completed the plant exploded and
injured the tenant and an invitee of the tenant, who are the plaintiffs herein. The
court, handing down the two decisions concurrently, held that the fact that the work
was done by an independent contractor did not exonerate the landlord from liability
for the injuries caused by the failure to use reasonable care in installing the heater.,
If a lessor of land has covenanted to make repairs on the premises, the authorities
hold the landlord liable to the lessee and persons on the land with the latter's
consent, for personal injuries or damages to property on the premises due to failure
to exercise reasonable care in making the repairs, although the landlord employed
an independent contractor to do the work. 4 There is very little Missouri authority on
this question.' The first time the St. Louis Court of Appeals had the case of Eberson
v. ContinentalInvestment Co.6 before it, the court said that the covenant in the lease
to repair was a personal one and the duty arising under it could not be delegated.
At the second trial of the case before the same court the landlord was held liable on
the ground that the repairs were dangerous unless special precautions, which were
omitted, were taken., In the absence of unusual dangers inherent in the work, this
court, in dictum, indicates that the lessor would not be liable.'
If the repairs are gratuitously undertaken by the lessor, the cases are far from
being in accord, but the weight of authority seems to be that the lessor cannot
relieve himself from liability by entrusting the work to an independent contractor.'
The Missouri cases are not in harmony on this question.0 The Missouri Supreme
Court held the landlord not liable in the case of Wiese v. Remme." But in the more
1. 62 S. W. (2d) 553 (Mo.1933).
2. 62 S. W. (2d) 559 (Mo.1933).
3. In the first case the court said: "The defendant's nonliability in the present case on the ground
of an independent contractor is denied on the ground
that the defendant's duty in using or seeing that
reasonable care was used in installing this heating
plant could not be delegated to a contractor, at least
so far as the result of the contractor's labor was
concerned."
In the second case the court said: "...
when a
landlord undertakes to make repairs or improvements
to his own building for his own, or his own and his
tenant's joint benefit, he is not relieved of liability for
the negligent or defective performance of the work
itself. . .by reason of having intrusted the work to an
independent contractor."
4. Mumby v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454, 6 So. 453
(1889); Prescott v. LeConte, 83 App. Div. 482, 82
N. Y. Supp. 411 (1903); Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Bagley,
126 Mich. 225, 85 N. W. 568 (1901); Blumenthal v.
Prescott, 70 App. Div. 560, 75 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1902),
72 App. Div. 620, 76 N. Y. Supp. 1009 (1902);
Nahm & Friedman v. Register Newspaper Co., 120
Ky. 485, 87 S. W. 296 (1905); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, Tentative Draft No. 6 (Am. L. Inst.
1931) §289; (1921) 15 A. L. R. 975; (1924) 29 A. L. R.
763.

5. McCleary, Liability of an Employer for the
Negligence of an Independent Contractor in Missouri
(1933) 18 ST. Louis L. REv. 289, at 301.
6.
118 Mo. App. 67, 93 S. W. 297 (1906).
7. 130 Mo. App. 296, 109 S. W. 62 (1908).
8. In the first appeal the court said: "The general
rule is that a proprietor. . .who lets a contract for
work to a competent person exercising an independent
employment. . .isnot answerable for negligence in
performing the work, unless it is subject to unusual
danger if pi ecautions are not taken."
9. Wilbur v. Follonsbee, 97 Wis. 577, 72 N. W.
741 (1897); Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573,
70 N. W. 824 (1897); Bancroft v. Godwin, 41 Wash.
253, 83 Pac. 189 (1905); Doyle v. Franek, 82 Neb.
616, 118 N. W. 468 (1908); M. Michael & Bro. v.
Billings Printing Co., 150 Ky. 253, 150 S. W. 77
(1912); Covington Co. v. Masonic Temple Co., 176
Ky. 729, 197 S. W. 420 (1917); Van Dam v. DotySalisbury Co. 218 Mich. 32, 187 N. W. 285 (1922);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS, op. cit. supra

note 4, §290; (1921) 15 A. L. R. 975; (1924) 29
A. L. R. 763. Contra: Louthan v. Hewes, 138 Cal.
116, 70 Pac. 1065 (1902); Bains v. Dank, 199 Ala.
250, 74 So. 341 (1917); Schatzky v. Harber, 164
N. Y. Supp. 610 (1917).
10. McCleary, op. cit. supra note 6, at 303.
11.
140 Mo. 289, 41 S. W. 797 (1897).
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recent case of Galber v. Grossberga the Court found the landlord liable, stress being
laid on the idea that the landlord, in having the improvements made, had violated
the tenant's right to the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the premises. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals in Noggle Wholesale & M. Co. v. Sellers & Marquis
Roofing Co.13 held that the landlord was not liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. But two years later the same court decided in Vollrath v. Stevens"4
that the landlord was liable. In the case of Burns v. McDonald"6 the St. Louis Court
of Appeals held the landlord not liable for the negligence of the independent contractor.
The cases under discussion seem to fall between the two classes of cases mentioned above. There was no covenant to repair, but neither was the work done
gratuitously, for the landlord received a consideration in the form of increased rent.
There are no Missouri cases directly in point, but since the court lays no emphasis
on the fact that the landlord was receiving a new consideration for the installation,
this decision may clarify the Missouri law as to gratuitous repairs and improvements. In holding the landlord liable in the present cases the court mentions the
fact that the work had been completed and accepted by the landlord before the
-explosion occurred.1" It seems evident from the language of the court, that the
cases would have reached the same result had this fact not been present.
W. L. NELSON, JR.

NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

Harke v. Haase.,

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant so negligently operated an automobile
that it ran up on the sidewalk. There was evidence to show that the defendant's
automobile skidded from the icy street to the sidewalk behind the defendant and
injured him. Since no specific negligence was alleged or proved the case can only be
supported on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court and supreme court
held that the doctrine was applicable to this case on the grounds that "the injured
person is not in a position to know the cause of the mishap" while the driver should
be, and since "such occurrence does not usually happen in the absence of negligence
-on the part of the one in control of the automobile." The court, emphasizing the
former reason, draws an analogy between this case and one involving injuries to a
passenger resulting from the derailment of a train.2
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when the following factors are present:
,(1) occurrences resulting in an injury which do not ordinarily happen if due care is
used; (2) the instrumentalities are under the management and control of the defendant; and (3) defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of information
.concerning the occurrence. 3
Assuming the evidence showed that there was no other car involved in the
accident to cause the defendant's car to skid up on the sidewalk, the second and third
12. 324 Mo. 742, 25 S. W (2d) 96 (1930).
13.
183 S. W. 659 (Mo. App. 1916).
14. 199 Mo. App. 5, 202 S. W. 283 (1918).
15. 57 Mo. App. 599 (1894); cf. Finer v. Nichols,
158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S. W. 889 (1911); Patton v.
'Eveker, 232 S. W. 762 (Mo. App. 1921).

16. In the first case the court said: "For this
defective and dangerous condition which inhered
in the completed work, we think the landlord should
be held liable notwithstanding he caused the work to
be done by an independent contractor."

1. 75 S. W. (2d) 1001 (Mo. 1934).
2. However, the case was reversed by the supreme
-court on an error in the instructions given by the trial
.court.

3. McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W.
(2d) 557 (1932).
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factors would be present.4 Sole control would be in the defendant driver. The
defendant would be better able to prove due care on his part or explain away or
justify the accident than would the plaintiff to prove a specific negligent act, since
he could not have seen the events leading up to the accident. Therefore, the problem
is whether the situation presented in this case is such that the jury may infer the
negligence from proof of its mere happening. The skidding does not, of itself, constitute evidence of negligence on the part of the driver so as to permit the application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.5 Thus the question is narrowed to whether the fact
that a car leaves the street and injures a pedestrian on the sidewalk is an occurrence
which would not happen in the exercise of due care.
The cases in the main declare that when the driver permits the car to be diverted from the street to the sidewalk with consequent injury to the plaintiff, it
indicates that he is negligent and establishes a primafacie case under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.' In fact, there is authority which holds that where a front wheel
rolled off the axle of a moving car and struck the plaintiff on the sidewalk, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was correctly applied., Thus the principal case does not take an
extreme position and the result is justified since all the elements necessary to support the application of the doctrine are present.
Moreover, it has been stated that the situation where an automobile leaves the
highway and turns into a ditch is analogous to a derailment in which type of case an
inference under res ipsa loquitur is raised. 8 Such a comparison justifies the analogy
drawn in the principal case and gives further foundation for the result.
But assuming the evidence showed that the defendant's car skidded up on the
sidewalk as a result of being struck by another car, it cannot be said that the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine is controlling.,
It is not absolutely clear from the case which set of facts was accepted. But the
supreme court states that the above testimony was not definitely enough set out to
take the case out of the res ipsa loquitur rule and therefore seems to interpret the
facts as under the first assumption.
HERBERT JACOB

LL.B., '35.

4.

Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal. App. 535, 259

Pac. 958 (1927); Scovanner v. Folke, 119 Ohio St.
256, 163 N. E. 493 (1928).

5.

De Antonio v. New Haven Dairy Co., 105

(1916); Bailey v. Fisher, 11 La. App. 187, 123 So. 166
(1929); Scovanner v. Folke,
(1931) 75 A. L. R. 562.

7.

supra note 4;

Note

Gates v. Crane Co. 107 Conn. 201, 139 Atl.

Conn. 663, 136Atl. 567 (1927); Osborne v. Charbnedu,

782 (1928). But see Mass. Bonding Co. v. Park, 197

48 Wash. 359, 218 Pac. 884 (1928); Note (1929)
64 A. L. R. 261.

Mich. 142, 163 N. W. 891 (1917).
8. Lawrence v. Pickwick Stages, Northern Division, 68 Cal. App. 494, 229 Pat. 885 (1924).

6. See Ivans v. Jacob 245 Fed. 892, 893, 895
(E. D. Pa. 1917); Goss v. Pacific Motor Co., 85 Cal.
App. 455, 259 Par. 455 (1927); Smith v. Hollander,
supra note 4; Brown v. Des Moines Steam Bottling
Works, 174 [a. 715, 156 N. W. 829, 1 A. L. R. 835

9. Staples v. Blinn Lumber Co., 97 Cal. App.
505, 275 Pac. 813 (1929) (Injury done to property);
McDonald v. Cantley, 214 Cal. 40, 3 Pac. (2d) 552
(1931) (Injury to workman on side of highway).
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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FICTION.
Inc. Cook v. Miller.'

In re Burniside Lodge,

In this case, the bankrupt was organized in the name of three dummy directors.
One share of stock was issued to each of the dummies; ninety-five shares were issued
to Cook and his wife, who were the real promoters of the corporation and managers
of the business, in return for the transfer of property which they had purchased for
the intended use before the incorporation; and one hundred and forty shares were
issued to Cook's aunt for a loan by her to Cook. Cook was voted a salary of $3,600.00
per year as manager, and his wife was voted a salary of $2,400.00 per year as assistant
manager. No credit for these salaries was ever entered on the books, but advances
were made to the Cooks from time to time and their personal expenses were paid
from the funds of the company. During the failing years of the corporation, the
Cooks did not draw any salaries in any form. When the corporation went into bankruptcy, Cook and his wife filed claims for these unpaid back salaries, and the aunt
filed a claim for loans to the corporation. The court disallowed all three claims,
holding that Cook could not make a claim since the corporation was his mere instrumentality, and to allow the claim would be to allow a bankrupt to collect on a
claim against his own bankrupt estate; and that the aunt loaned the money to Cook
and stands in the same position as Cook.
It is well-settled that stockholders and directors can become creditors of the
corporation so long as there is fair dealing.2 Such debts may even be secured by
mortgages running from the company to the stockholders or directors.'
The only factor in the principal case which might take it out of the operation
of this general rule is that in the principal case Cook is a sole stockholder. Because
of this fact, the court here disregarded the corporate fiction and refused to allow the
claim. It is submitted that such a holding is not justified.
The law confers certain advantages, such as limited liability, upon incorporated
businesses. Cook here acted as the law directed to secure these advantages. Therefore he should have the protection which the law promised him and he should not
be penalized for'seeking in good faith that which was offered by the state.4 And by
so incorporating, a separate and distinct legal entity comes into existence.' In all
cases where the corporate entity is disregarded, it must appear that there is some
element which would make it unjust and inequitable to consider the corporation
attacked a separate entity. 6
Had an outsider been hired as manager, there could be no doubt but that he
could recover for his unpaid salaries. And a sole stockholder cannot be distinguished
from an outsider, since each is distinct from the corporation. It is therefore submitted that a similar result should be reached where a sole stockholder does the
same work. He does not owe a duty to the corporation to work for it, and hence is
7
entitled to compensation for his work.
It might have been contended in the principal case that the withdrawals were
not tabulated, and that therefore it would be impossible to say what the balance
1. 7 F. Supp. 785 (1934).
2. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 589;
McKee v. Bruns, 243 F. 370, 156 C. C. A. 150 (1927);
Stevenson v. Sicklesteel Lumber Co., 219 Mich. 18,
188 N. W. 449 (1922); La Salle St. Trust & Savings
Bank of Chicago v. Topeka Milling Co., 101 Kan.
446, 167 P. 1036 (1917), L. R. A. 1918 A., 574; Hunter v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co., 156 La. 19, 100
So. 35 (1924).
3. In re Pratt Laundry Co., 1 F. (2d) 982 (1924);
Stuart v. Larson, 298 F. 223 (1924); Geisenberger &
Freidler v. Robert York & Co., 262 F. 739 (1919).

4. Solomon v. Solomon & Co., Ltd., (1897)
A. C. 22; Dollar Cleansers & Dyers, Inc. v. MacGregor,
161 Atl. 159, (Md., 1932).
5.
Solomon v. Solomon & Co., Ltd., supra, Note
4; 1 Fletcher on Corporations (Perm. Ed.), 90;
Vennerbeck & Chase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co.,
164 Atl. 509, (R. 1., 1933).
6. U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.,
142 F. 247.
7. Vennerbeck & Chase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry
Co., supra, Note 5; Glynn v. Columbus Club, 21
R. 1. 534, 45 Atl. 551 (1900).
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owing, if any, was. 8 But such facts are not clearly set forth in the principal case and
no reliance was made thereon either by the creditors or by the court.
The foregoing discussion has been based on the assumption that there was no
fraud practiced upon creditors by Cook in the principal case. This assumption seems
justified since no allegation of fraud is made, nor does the court rely upon the presence of fraud in reaching its decision. But supposing fraud to be present, it is submitted that even then the court would not be justified in disregarding the fiction.
It is true that courts are prone in the case of fraud to disregard the fiction and to
consider the corporation and the sole stockholder as one.9 But the writer believes
that such a solution puts the status of the corporate entity in doubt and is unnecessary in order to avoid inequitable results. So in the principal case, if it can be shown
that Cook has been guilty of practicing some fraud on the creditors of the corporation, such as issuing financial statements which were misleading in that they did not
reflect the debt owing to Cook, Cook would be estopped as to the creditors who
relied upon the representation so made, to claim that the debt was owing.o Where
advances are made or money is loaned for the purpose of establishing a fictitious
credit for the bankrupt and so enables him to defraud others, the whole transaction
is contaminated by the fraud, and the court of bankruptcy will not aid the conspirators by allowing claims for such advances." This solution would avoid disregarding
the corporate fiction and would fully protect the bona fide creditors.
SOLBERT M. WASSERSTROM

LL.B., '35.

INTENT TO DEFAME AS AN ELEMENT IN LIBEL. Becker v. Brinkop.'
In ruling on a demurrer to a libel petition, the court said: "To make defendants
liable for the publication of the libelous circular, it must appear that the defendants
were aware that the circular was, or probably might be libelous. . .These elements
must appear, for the reason that, if defendants could prove that they were wholly
ignorant of the contents of the circular, and had no reason to suppose that it contained libelous matter, they could not be held liable for it because it could not then
be said that they had consciously published a libel."
The language quoted indicates that the plaintiff in a libel suit must fail unless
there is some showing that the defendant published the libel in question intentionally,
or was to some extent negligent in not knowing that the matter was libelous. This is
contra to the rule announced by prior Missouri cases, and the weight of authority
in other jurisdictions. While the question has been discussed but rarely in Missouri,
the cases found enunciate the majority rule with clarity and emphasis. In Jones v.
Murray,' the court held, "if the publication is false, and the plaintiff has suffered
actual damages, he is entitled to recover such damages, no matter how innocently, or
8. Gordon v. Baton Rouge Store, Co., Inc., etal.,
168 La. 248, 121 So. 759 (1929).
9. U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.,
supra Note 6.

10. See In re Desnoyers Shoe Co., 210 F. 533, 32
Am. Banker Rep. 51.
11. In re Friedman, 164 F. 131, 21 Am. Bankers
Rep. 213; In re Royce Dry Goods Co., 133 F. 100,
13 Am. Bankers Rep. 257.

1. 78 S.W. (2d) 538 (Mo. App. 1935).
2. Farley v. Evening Chronicle Publishing Co.,
113 Mo. App. 216, 87 S. W. 165 (1905); Jones v.
Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 66 S.W. 981 (1902); Morris v.

Sailer, 154 Mo. App. 305, 134 S. W. 98 (1911);
McGinnis v. Knapp, & Co., 109 Mo. 131, 18 S. W.
1134 (1891).
3. Supra note 2
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with what purpose, intent, or motive the defendant acted." In Farley v. Evening
Chronicle Publishing Company,4 it was said that "a libel is a tort, and, generally
speaking, neither the intention with which the tort feasor acted, nor the state of his
feelings towards the person injured or mankind at large lessens his responsibility for
injuries actually caused by his wrongful act." In Morris v. Sailer,5 the court affirmed
the rule: "But, conceding that defendant really did not intend to charge libelous matter, that will not excuse him." A few cases from other jurisdictions support the view
of the principal case. 6 In Smith v.Ashley' it was said that "if the defendant had no
knowledge that the article published was libelous, he has been guilty of no wrong,
and is not responsible by law although the plaintiff has been injured." On the other
hand, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view expressed in the
Missouri cases cited, 8 and a defendant in a libel suit is held to answer for the consequences of his publication regardless of his intention or of his use of due care. NEWELL
on SLANDER AND LIBEL' says that "in actions for defamation it is immaterial what
meaning the speaker intended to convey." ODGERS on LIBEL AND SLANDER'" says that
"the law looks to the tendency and consequences of the publication, not at the
intention of the publishers." It is interesting to note that the court in the principal
case cited Odgers as authority for the rule it laid down." While it is true that Odgers
does enunciate a similar rule, he carefully restricts its application to a case in which,
as he says, ". . . the defendant is not himself the author, writer or printer of a publication, or in any way connected with or responsible for its being composed, written
or printed." Apparently the court overlooked the fact that the rule it announced
was taken from a section in Odger's book devoted to the liability of a mere disseminator, such as the vendor of a newspaper or magazine, and cites the rule as
applying in all libel cases.
*S.RUSSELL VANDIVORT
*LL.B.'35.

4. Supra note 2.
5. Supra note 2.
6. Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass.
293, 34 N. E. 462, 20 L. R. A. 856 (1893); Taylor v.
Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 Pac. 392 (1895); Smith v.
Ashley, 52 Mass. (11 Metf.) 367, 45 Am. Dec. 216
(1846); Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137 (1860).
7. Supra note 6.
8. Laudati v. Stea, 44 R. 1. 300, 117 Atl. 422, 26
A. L. R. 450 (1922); Peck v. Tribune, 214 U. S. 185,
29 Sup. Ct. 554, 16 Ann. Ca,. 1075 (1909); Hatfieldv.

Gazette Printing Co., 103 Kan. 513, 175 Pac. 382
(1918); Bennet v. Stockwell, 197 Mich. 50, 163 N. W.
482, Ann. Cas. 1918E 1193, L. R. A. 1917F 761 (1917);
Butler. v. Every Evening Printing Co., (C. C. D. Del.
1905) 140 Fed. 934, aff'd., 144 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 3d,
1906); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 Pac. 530
(1911); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58,
126 N. E. 260, 10 A. L. R. 662 (1920).
9. (4th ed. 1924) 301.
10. (5th ed. 1911) 341.
11. (5th ed. 1911) 158.

